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The study of organizations has been approached by anthropologists, 
sociologists, (social) psychologists and economists. The share of eco- 
nomics has been modest. This seems surprising because economists 
have developed a "theory of the firm", but this theory is rather si- 
lent about the internal functioning of firms. It would probably be 
more appropriate to characterize this theory as a theory of markets. 
However, we believe that recent developments in economic theory 
provide room for a new attempt to analyse many aspects of the in- 
ternal functioning of organizations (Hendrikse (1993)). This article 
will concentrate on corporate culture. 
Corporate culture will be analysed with respect to its conscious 
choice aspects, i.e. it is assumed that people choose to which cor- 
porate culture they want to adhere. The factors influencing this choice 
will be analysed at the level of the individual, the firm and the mar- 
ket. The main concept used at the individual level is the concep- 
tualization of bounded rationality as an incomplete contract. Cor- 
porate culture is seen as a way to complete the incomplete contract 
by providing a coordination device for individuals in order to choose 
a particular course of action. The main idea employed at the firm 
level of analysis is the notion of critical mass. It is argued that the 
emergence of a new culture depends crucially on a certain percen- 
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tage of people adopting it. Otherwise, a culture may persist which is 
not optimal from the point of view of the company. Everybody gains 
when all switch to a new culture. However, if less than half of the 
people is going to switch, then each individual is better off staying 
with the old culture. Finally, the competitive and strategic analysis 
employs concepts like imitability and first mover advantages. A cor- 
porate culture is hard to change and may therefore provide a bene- 
ficial commitment to a particular strategy in the market. 
This article is organized as follows. Section two conceptualizes 
and defines corporate culture. The utility maximizing behavior of 
individuals and the relation between the behavioral characteristics 
of the individuals who generate some social aggregate (e.g. corpo- 
rate culture) is analysed in section three. The characteristics of the 
aggregate are anaiysed in tne fourth section. Section five rciaies our 
analysis to the current literature on corporate culture. Finally, a con- 
clusion is provided. 
11. CORPORATE CULTURE AT THE INDIVIDUAL LEVEL 
Corporate culture is a difficult notion to grasp for economists be- 
cause the dominant neoclassical approach perceives human agents 
as having unlimited cognitive abilities to deal with the complex world 
surrounding them (Heiner (1983)). Once we abandon this assump- 
tion, scope is created for thinking about notions like rules of thumb, 
seemingly myopic behavior, errors, and so on. Simon (1965) deve- 
lops in this context the notion of bounded rationality as behavior 
that is "intendedly rational, but only limitedly so". 
Many people are willing to take decisions which increase the va- 
lue of the firm, but they quite often don't know what course of ac- 
tion is most desirable. Schelling (1960) observes for such coordina- 
tion problems in general that "What is necessary is to coordinate 
predictions, to read the same message in the common situation, to 
identify the one course of action that their expectations of each other 
converge upon. They must "mutually recognize" some unique signal 
that coordinates their expectations of each other. We cannot be sure 
they will meet, nor would all couples read the same signal, but the 
chances are certainly a great deal better than if they pursued a ran- 
dom course of search". This is where the importance of corporate 
culture emerges. It provides a "clue for coordinating behavior, some 
focal point for each person's expectation of what the other expects 
him to expect to be expected to do". 
The recent literature on incomplete contracts provides a way to 
deal with bounded rationality and corporate culture. Contracts spe- 
cify what will be done when certain contingencies arise. However, it 
is costly to think through all possible contingencies that might pos- 
sibly arise. The best that can be done is therefore to write incom- 
plete contracts, i.e. only the most important aspects of the relation- 
ship will be included in the contract. Contracts are incomplete in 
the sense that it is left open what will be done when contingencies 
arise that are not specified in the contract. Once an unforeseen con- 
tingency arises, a decision has to be made about what course of ac- 
tion to pursue. This is resolved by deciding at the start of the relation- 
ship who has the discretion over such decisions (Grossman and Hart 
(1986)), i.e. somebody is given the authority to selectively intervene 
in the operations of the firm. An examplc is a labor contract. It 
specifies broadly which tasks the employee has to carry out, the length 
and amount of the working days and the salary that will be payed. 
However, it does not specify for each instant in time what has to be 
done. The employer has the freedom to assign the employee to tasks 
in situations which are not described by the contract. The hierar- 
chical relationship is accepted by the employee because the organi- 
zation has a reputation that fairlequitable decisions will be made, 
and will be honored because it allows for future beneficial transac- 
tions to be undertaken (IOeps (1990)). 
However, this assignment of authority doesn't eliminate the cost 
of specifying every time what has to be done once an unforeseen 
contingency has arisen. The organization would like that their mem- 
bers somehow know what is a good decision and that it is carried 
out. An aspect of a good decision is that it somehow matches with 
the decisions taken by others. A corporate culture might be valuable 
in this respect because it indicates a preference for a particular way 
of synchronizing these different and dispersed decisions. Corporate 
culture is thcrefore an example of a network with positive externa- 
lities, like a telephone system. Buying a telephone becomes more 
attractive when more people have one. Similar considerations apply 
to corporate culture. Decisions have to be matched and a possibility 
to establish this is corporate culture. It increases in value when more 
people adopt the same culture. A corporate culture reduces uncer- 
tainty by guiding behavior in situations where many courses of ac- 
tion could be taken. It helps employees fill in the gaps between what 
is formally decreed and what actually takes place. This is how the 
contract is "completed" (Kreps (1984)). How these gaps are actually 
filled depends on time and place and the persons involved. 
111. CORPORATE CULTURE AT THE FIRM LEVEL 
There are many possible definitions of corporate culture that can be 
given and many notions which are close or somehow touch on this 
phenomena (like codes in Arrow (1974) and conventions in Leiben- 
stein (1982)). We will not try to somehow classify them or formulate 
requirements which should be incorporated in such a definition, but 
take the observations of the previous section as a starting point. The 
underlying features of the above analysis of corporate culture are 
that bounded rationality necessitates the adoption of certain rules 
or conventions by individuals and that it is in the interest of the 
organization when the members of the organization adopt the same 
rules. Corporate culture is therefore defined as a collection of mu- 
tually consistent shared conventions of an organization. This defini- 
tion allows for several corporate cultures to occur at the same time. 
This occurs when two or more not mutually consistent sets of con- 
ventions exist in the same organization, e.g. a marketing and an en- 
gineering culture. 
The above considerations allow for the possibility to incorporate 
the factor power into the analysis. Some organization members have 
the power to implement formal changes which will influence the choi- 
ce between cultures by all other members. Formal changes are cap- 
tured by the rules of the contract (i.e. the agenda of the organiza- 
tion). If the contract rules change, then this will change the contin- 
gencies not covered by the contract and subsequently determine the 
frame of reference and the direction of corporate culture. So, the 
coordinating role of corporate culture is exercised within the set of 
uncovered contingencies and this can be influenced by those having 
power. Informal exchange and communication is guided by and exer- 
cised within these formal rules. An example is the choice of organi- 
zation structure. A functional organization structure is organized 
around functions like marketing, finance and manufacturing. Its 
strength lies in exploiting economies of scale and an engineering cul- 
ture usually prevails in such organizations. A divisional organization 
structure is organized around products. It is especially suitable for 
responding to changes in the market and to synchronize marketing 
and engineering perspectives. The corporate culture of a divisional 
organization is usually less dominated by engineers. The set of unfore- 
seen contingencies of these organization structures will be different 
and they will probably respond differently to a particular unfore- 
seen contingency. 
An example of establishing a corporate culture in the minds of 
organizational members is the formulation of a strategic plan. A stra- 
tegic plan formulates the objectives of an organization and the stra- 
tegies to achieve these objectives. It takes a lot of time and effort to 
formulate a strategic plan, but it often seems to disappear in some 
file without being implemented, and people wonder about its use- 
fulness. However, it has fulfilled its role in the process of formu- 
lating it by being a framing device for focussing/coordinating beha- 
viol- of people, and therefore guides behavior in uncertain situa- 
tions. Anothcr way of formulating this is that the process of formu- 
lating a strategic plan tried to establish a more favorable attitude or 
informal exchange and commu~lication between employees. 
Corporate culture was viewed in the previous section as a way to 
complete the incomplete contract. There are several possibilities to 
do this, but the main interest will now be just the emergence of a 
corporate culture. It is therefore sufficient to consider the decision 
of whether a person will join or not join a particular corporate cul- 
ture and how this decision is influenced by the environment faced 
by each person. Some of the terminology which will be used here 
has been developed by Farrell and Saloner ((1985), (1986)) in the 
context of product innovation. Notions like standardization and com- 
patibility will be employed. 
Each individual is assumed to be characterized by a benefit func- 
tion. It consists of two components: the attractiveness of a parti- 
cular culture and how this attractiveness is influenced by which other 
persons are adopting this culture. It specifies for each person how 
much (s)he likes a certain culture and the benefit from switching to 
a new culture as a function of who else will switch. Formally, Bi(C,S,) 
represents the benefit for person i of adopting culture C and S, is 
the set of people who have already adopted culture C. It is assumed 
for simplicity that there are only two cultures which can be chosen, 
i.e. C takes on a value X or Y. Individuals choose either to parti- 
cipate in one set of shared conventions (, i.e. one culture) or anot- 
her. The set of people adopting a culture represents both the num- 
ber of people and the characteristics of each individual. The diffe- 
rence between persons is represented by the index i and therefore 
allows for heterogeneity in the population. 
For example, a dogmatist is characterized by putting strong empha- 
sis on the first term, whereas a follow the crowd type of personality 
places a high value on the second component. A charismatic person 
has a personality which motivates and influences other people. This 
is modelled by attaching a high value to adopting the same culture 
as this person, i.e. the value of culture X for person i (B,(X,S,)) is 
much higher with the charismatic person in S, than without him. 
A crucial assulnption is that whatever a person's choice, (s)he pre- 
fers to have others make the same choice (, i.e. adopt the same 
culture). This critical mass assumption makes the choices of indivi- 
duals interdependent. When this interdependence (or social pres- 
sure) is an important consideration for a person deciding which cul- 
ture to adopt, early movers can influence later movers' decisions : if 
person 1 switches to a new culture, then person 2 will find switching 
more attractive than if person 1 had not switched. The culture(s) at 
the firm level is (are) therefore generated by the choices made by 
individuals. 
The interdependence of choices might result in a corporate cul- 
ture which is not optimal from a company wide point of view. If 
everybody could perfectly foresee how all the other persons would 
react to his (her) choice, then a firm will never be trapped in an 
inferior culture. The better alternative will always emerge because 
everbody knows what is best and that it can be achieved. However, 
if the reactions of others can not be perfectly foreseen, then "excess 
inertia" can occur. Excess inertia is a socially excessive reluctance to 
switch to a superior new culture when important spillovers or net- 
work externalities are present in the current one. People might be 
stuck with an undesirable culture, while there is a better alternative 
available. The recent switch in the Soviet Union towards a more 
market oriented economy is a prominent example. A similar situa- 
tion occurs when people are attracted towards and move to some- 
thing new, whereas the old culture is actually better. However, it 
will be hard to reverse such a move. The problem is that no person 
can be sure that (s)he would be followed in a switch to the new 
culture. The incomplete information results in coordination pro- 
blems, which prevents the new culture to be adopted even when 
adoption is favored by all persons. This arises when all persons only 
moderately favor the change, and hence are themselves insufficient- 
ly motivated to start or join a new culture, but would join if suffi- 
ciently many people adopted it. In terms of the benefit function, 
B,(X,S,) has moreless the same values as B,(Y,S,) for all persons. 
Another way of saying this is that social pressure and faits accom- 
plis (or the lack thercof) might be responsible for a firm having an 
inferior culture, while a better alternative could be chosen. Strong 
labor unions or rigid bureaucratic organization structures may be 
responsible for delays in favorable changes. 
An escape from an undesirable culture is possible by replacing a 
person who is only moderately favoring a change by somebody strong- 
ly favoring a change. This person will stick with the new culture re- 
gardless the decision of his colleagues. This commitment will make 
the old culture less attractive to those currently adhering to it and 
might trigger the switch to the new culture. Examples of this compa- 
rative statics result are the firing of old and the appointment of new 
employees or managers and the imprisonment or execution of key 
persons in times of political revolutions. Another way of overcoming 
some of the coordination problems is of course to allow for some 
communication between people. Communication will change each 
person's subjective probability assessment about a switch being fol- 
lowed. The outcome will change, but it doen't eliminate the pro- 
blem that we have seen completely. 
The time needed for a switch in culture to occur did not yet get 
any explicit attention. The presence of an installed base may result 
in excess inertia, even with complete information. If a new corpo- 
rate culture is built up of new persons in the organization, then de- 
lays are caused by the time it takes for enough new people to arrive, 
i.e. a critical mass of new people adhering to the new culture has to 
be built up. It implies that the history of the organization may play 
an important role in the formation of that organization's culture. 
The choices made by the founding fathers influence the behaviour 
of those who come later. The arrival of people adhering to a new 
culture causes two externalities. First, the adoption of the new cul- 
ture affects the people adhering to the old culture. Their culture 
ceases to spread and becomes relatively less attractive. Second, an 
early adopter of the new culture enhances its appeal to later users. 
If the new culture is built up through adherers switching to the old 
culture, then delays are caused by the time it takes for persons ad- 
hering to the old culture to switch. This is called the penguin effect. 
Penguins who must enter the water to find food often delay doing 
so because they fear the presence of predators. Each would prefer 
some other penguin to test the waters first. 
The selection of workers across cultures depends on the benefit 
function of all persons involved. This determines whether there is a 
complete, partial, or absent emergence of the new corporate cul- 
ture. Persons eager to switch will do so and make it therefore more 
attractive for others to switch too. Only those persons who really 
don't like the new culture stay with the old one, even though it is 
less attractive for them once several colleagues have switched. A 
replacement of such persons might be necessany in situations where 
a complete emergence of the new corporate c~alture is desirable. 
The desirability of two or more corporate cultures (, i.e. the par- 
tial emergence of the new corporate culture) depends on the trade- 
off between diversity and standardization. It can be thought of as 
diversity in order to prevent myopia and standardization as the be- 
nefit of "all noses pointed in one direction", i.e. facilitating team- 
work and effective decision-making. If standardization is the most 
important concern, then the benefits of one culture over another 
have to be evaluated. If diversity is the dominant concern of the 
organization, then the problem is having one versus two cultures. It 
might be difficult to establish two corporate cultures due to the in- 
terdependence of preferences. 
A good or bad culture has not been explicitly defined. The only 
issue was the emergence of a particular culture at the level of the 
organization. This is determined by the choices of the members of 
the organization. Their decisions may coincide with the organiza- 
tional goal(s) but may also conflict with them. A bad organizational 
culture may survive for a while because the constituents have an 
interest in maintaining the status quo. A bad culture may also emer- 
ge by an unfortunate appointment or by the unwillingness of incum- 
bents to adapt to a new situation. 
IV. CORPORATE CULTURE AT THE MARKET LEVEL 
The emergence of corporate culture at the firm level will be taken 
as given in this section. The interest is now the competition between 
firms with different corporate cultures in an industry. We will first 
look at competition by only considering the number of firms in an 
industry. Subsequently, the strategic aspects of the choice of corpo- 
rate culture are analysed. 
The analysis of Lippman and Rumelt (1982) has implications for 
corporate culture at the market level. Their argument in our setting 
runs as follows. Each firm is composed of a particular set of em- 
ployees, which accounts for a certain culture. This is summarized at 
the firm level by a particular level of the costs of production. Firms 
in an industry face different costs, because some cultures do better 
than others. The distribution of these costs determines a (maxi- 
mum) cutoff level of production costs at which a firm can make non- 
negative profits. Firms with costs above this level will make negative 
profits and leave the industry. Some firms just survive by making 
zero profits, whereas others make actually positive profits in the long 
run. These differences within the class of surviving firms occur be- 
cause there is uncertainty regarding production costs when the entry 
decision has to be made. A firm doesn't know its precise production 
costs because the environment is too uncertain and complex to be 
grasped immediately. The actual costs can therefore be viewed as a 
realisation of a stochastic variable. Firms will not enter the industry 
anymore when the cutoff level has dropped to such an extent that 
profitable entry is unlikely. So, competitive advantages of corporate 
culture are able to generate above normal profits at the market le- 
vel in the long run. The excellent firms within the class of survivors 
are responsible for this. Necessary and sufficient conditions for cor- 
porate culture to be profitable in the long run are that corporate 
culture is valuable, rare and imperfectly imitable. (An unique com- 
pletion of the incomplete contract or the unique hiring sequence of 
organizational members are examples of these conditions.) The pro- 
cess of entry and exit can not eliminate these profits. Barney (1986) 
concludes that "culture research, and the consulting it implies, can 
not be used to help firms with valuable, rare, or imperfectly imitable 
cultures or management skills to obtain sustained above normal per- 
formance, for such efforts are, in principle, imitable". Imitable cul- 
tures won't generate above normal profits in the long run, due to 
the process of entry and exit. However this doesn't mean that cul- 
ture research is rendered unfruitful. Culture research might be able 
to identify factors that are important for performance not to drop 
below normal profits and that it will result in advising to maintain, 
protect, and exploit your unique factors, rather than just imitating 
rivals. 
The effect of national culture on performance is channeled through 
markets. American, European and Japanese car producers are com- 
peting with each other in the market. If the Japanese have a compe- 
titive edge due to cultural factors, then they are advised to develop 
these sources of profits even further. (These profits will of course 
disappear when there are scvcral companies from the same nation 
competing fiercely against each other.) The imperfectly imitable as- 
pects of a corporate culture are generated in our analysis by the 
composition of the internal labour force. They determine how the 
incomplete contract is completed and in which direction this com- 
pletion is going. American and European car producers should stress 
and protect their strengths in order to generate above normal pro- 
fits, instead of trying to imitate japanese successes. Imitation will 
only increase competition and therefore only generate just normal 
profits. 
The above analysis has abstracted away the strategic aspects of 
the corporate culture choice. However, markets with a small num- 
ber of firms usually provide some scope for this behavior. An impor- 
tant aspect in such situations is the distinction between short and 
long run decisions. Short run decisions are taken daily or weekly 
and therefore reversible, wheras long run decisons are only taken 
once in a while. Long run decisions have often a sunk character, i.e. 
there are usually costs involved in changing them, because they are 
geared towards a particular purpose. Examples of investments with 
a sunk cost feature are the choice of capacity of a steel mill or the 
amount spend on advertising. It is not possible to recoup these in- 
vestments (completely) and use them in another context. This irre- 
versibility feature limits the choices available to the firm in the fu- 
ture. Reduced options to choose from may actually be advantageous 
in strategic situations because they structure the competitive envi- 
ronment in a way favorable to the firm. For example, the marltet 
becomes less attractive for potential entrants when the incumbent 
builds a large production capacity. The choice of a corporate cul- 
ture has similar sunk aspects associated with it. A corporate culture 
can not be sold and casual empiricism suggests that there are consi- 
derable costs involved in changing it. The costs associated with a 
corporate culture are therefore sunk and it forms a commitment to 
certain behavior inside the firm as well as in the market. Hendrikse 
(1991) has shown that marltet considerations may outweigh internal 
organization concerns in the organization structure choice. Firms 
choose in his setup either a functional or divisional organization struc- 
ture. Economies of scale and coordination issues may be such that 
a functional organization and the corresponding corporate culture is 
chosen when there are no competitors in the market. However, (po- 
tential) competition may require a divisionalized structure and there- 
fore a different corporate culture, despite the superior internal or- 
ganization aspects of a functional structure. A divisional organiza- 
tion gives the firm a more aggressive profile in the market, which 
makes it more difficult for potential entrants to invade the market. 
Profits of the incumbent firm have decreased due to the adoption of 
a divisional structure, but they are still higher than profits with a 
functional structure and an additional competitor in the market. 
V. RELATIONSHIP TO PREVIOUS I2,ESULTS 
We will relate our framework and results to the literature on cor- 
porate culture in this section. The comparison will be done section 
by section. 
Analyses of culture inspired by the transaction cost approach have 
similarities with our second section. We agree with Jones (1983) that 
organizational culture is framed by the institutional arrangements 
that are developed to regulate the exchanges of transactions bet- 
ween members of a social group. However, culture has also a role to 
play within this frame. It implicitly coordinates the actions of orga- 
nizational members, as has been pointed out extensively in section 
two. Ouchi (1980) states that "the set of traditions in a formal orga- 
nization may produce a unified, although implicit, philosophy or point 
of view, functionally equivalent to a theory about how that organi- 
zation should work. A member who grasps such an essential theory 
can deduce from it an appropriate rule to govern any possible deci- 
sion, thus producing a very elegant and complete form of control". 
Our analysis is in this spirit, but we don't think that it is restricted 
to the clan organization, which is characterized by low goal incon- 
gruence and high performance ambiguity. Even environments with 
low goal incongruence and low performance ambiguity require a cul- 
ture which coordinates the actions of boundedly rational agents. 
Culture plays a similar role at the firm level in Weick (1987). His 
analysis is built on the assumption that "the variety that exists in the 
system to be managed exceeds the variety in the people who must 
regulater', i.e. the cognitive capabilities of employees are insufficient 
to grasp the complexity of the world (bounded rationality) and there- 
fore they don't know the right decision for the organization when 
faced with unforeseen contingencies. Culture might resolve this be- 
cause it "creates a homogeneous set of assumptions and decision 
premises which, when they are invoked on a local and decentralized 
basis preserve coordination and centralization". We arrive at a simi- 
lar conclusion, although our starting point is quite different. 
Akerlof (1991) derives inertia regarding the emergence of a par- 
ticular corporate culture by analyzing small mistakes in repeated de- 
cisions. Each choice may be close to the maximizing one at a parti- 
cular time, but the cumulative effect of a series of repeated errors 
may be quite large. Examples are phenomena like procrastination 
and obedience. Current costs and benefits count much heavier than 
those in the distant future. Required actions are postponed until 
tomorrow without foreseeing that when tomorrow comes, these tasks 
will be delayed again. This implies in our context that establishing a 
superior corporate culture today is put off until tomorrow, because 
the disutility of disobeying today is salient relative to an even more 
painful change tomorrow. 
Scharfstein and Stein (1990) concentrate on reputational exter- 
nalities instead off compatibility externalties. If somebody adopts a 
particular culture, then others will tend to be biased toward the same 
culture for reputational reasons. Making a mistake when others fol- 
low the same approach is not as bad as a failure when an indepen- 
dent course of action has been followed. They cite Keynes in this 
respect with "Wordly wisdom teaches that it is better for reputation 
to fail conventionally than to succeed unconventionally". Akerlof 
(1980) specifies the benefits of adhering to a corporate culture by a 
reputation function. The assumption is that more reputation is lost 
by breaking with a culture when the number of believers in the cor- 
porate culture is larger. Persons adhere to the prevailing corporate 
culture either if they are reluctant to lose reputation by breaking it 
or if their belief in it is sufficiently strong. Akerlof's model allows 
preferences of employees to be changed. Self-selection might result 
in socialization. However, employees may adhere again to the pre- 
vailing corporate culture, even though they don't believe m it. They 
adhere to a certain culture due to social pressure, although another 
culture is preferred. 
We have hardly paid any attention to communication issues in 
order to resolve the coordination problem. The classic starting point 
for economics of such an analysis is the theo~y of teams by Mar- 
schak and Radner (1972). Cremer (1987) analyses within this frame- 
work the quality of a response, based on its appropriateness and 
speed, in a world with bounded rationality. 
Soeters and Schreuder (1986) provide an empirical study with res- 
pect to the effect of national culture on organizational cultures in 
accounting firms. They advance a "socialization hypothesis" versus a 
"(self-)selection hypothcsis" as possible explanations for their empi- 
rical results with respect to the existence of different corporate cul- 
tures at the firm level. Their empirical result is expressed as fol- 
lows : "The significant effects of the US-culture upon the organiza- 
tional cultures of the Big Eight firms operating in The Netherlands 
are surprising if one takes into account that these firms employ hard- 
ly any US-citizens". The (self-)selection hypothesis states that em- 
ployees are attracted to those firms already conforming to certain 
aspccts of their preferences. The socialization hypothesis states that 
employees internalize aspects of corporate culture through organi- 
zational processes of socialization. We interpret the socialization hy- 
pothesis as tiying to mold the preferences of employees so as to 
make them (more) supportive of the corporate culture. This trans- 
lates in changing the benefit function in the terminology of the third 
section. A weaker notion of the socialization-hypothesis is adopted 
in section three by leaving the benefit function unchanged but allo- 
wing a difference between obeying a corporate culture and liking it, 
i.e. a person obeys a certain culture because others do, but (s)he 
prefers another culture when enough other people adhered to this 
other culture. So, employees may adhere to the prevailing corporate 
culture, even though they don't believe in it. Our model poses there- 
fore that a selection and socialization hypothesis might be operating 
together in equilibrium. 
Notice that our approach of persons making choices with respect 
to corporate culture belies what has come to be understood in the 
interpretive literature about cultural processes and phenomena in 
organizational settings. Culture rests in this literature on a set of 
subjectivist, internal assumptions. Organizational symbols (see e.g. 
Morgan, Frost and Pondy (1983)) are signs which "express much 
more than their intrinsic whole, they are significations which embo- 
dy and represent some wider pattern of meaning". Individuals were 
considered as making an explicit choice between participation in one 
corporate culture or another in section three. It is subsequently used 
to guide certain decisions implicitly, i.e. it is used to complete the 
incomplete contract. The study of Soeters and Schreuder (1983) pro- 
vides empirical support for the perspective that thcrc are at least 
some conscious choice aspects associated with corporate culture at 
the firm level. They found that their results "may rather be due to 
(self-) selection than to socialization mechanisms". 
Another difference between our approach and the interpretive 
literature is due to the definition of corporate culture used. We de- 
fine corporate culture in terms of shared conventions, whereas the 
interpretive literature defines culture in terms of norms and values. 
Notice also that our definition of corporate culture as a collection 
of mutually consistent shared conventions of an organization does 
not allow for a culture consisting of internal contradictions. How- 
ever, we allow for two or more cultures to exist at the same time, 
which might complement, or possibly contradict, each other. So, it 
might seem as if there is one culture consisting of internal contra- 
dictions at the organization level, whereas there are actually two or 
more in our terminology. 
Soeters (1986) has offered two hypotheses about the decline of 
excellent companies. The first hypothesis is that companies that are 
possessed by their corporate culture run the risk of becoming myo- 
pic. His second hypothesis stresses the tendency of mobilization pro- 
cesses to decline in intensity after a while. However, being posses- 
sed by a corporate culture without being myopic and having an in- 
tense mobilization process seems not to be good enough to guaran- 
tee sustained above normal profits in the long run. Excellent coin- 
panies are excellent because their efforts are valuable, unique, and 
inimitable, and not because they are not myopic or not intense. Being 
intense and not myopic might be necessary, but it is not sufficient to 
generate and sustain above normal profits. There are of course other 
contributions with respect to organizational decline (e.g. Nystrom 
and Starbuck (1984), Whetten (1980)) but this study is discussed 
because it illustrates nicely the role played by the three conditions 
formulated in the fourth section. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This article has looked at corporate culture at the individual, firm, 
and market level of analysis. It has shown how individual behavior is 
embedded in the analysis of the firm, and subsequently the firm in 
the market environment. Concepts like incomplete contracts, com- 
patibility and imitability were applied to the phenomenon of corpo- 
rate culture. These notions wcre used to analyse the role of corpo- 
rate culture at the individual level of analysis. its group dynamics 
and market forces. The main focus was on coordination issues. How- 
ever, an important aspect not dealt with in this paper arc incentive 
issues. Further research might address such issues like those treated 
in Sniezelt et. al. (1990). They have investigated in this context the 
conflicting individual and collective interests of the reward system in 
decisions of groups. 
Finally, the emphasis on some economic dimensions of corporate 
culture is not to be interpreted as somc judgment about the many 
contributions made by other social sciences to our current thinlting 
a h o ~ t  corporate culti~re It is hoped that the largely ignored field of 
corporate culture by economists will be further developed and that 
there will bc more cross fertilisation bctween the different approa- 
ches, empirical as well as theoretical. 
REFERENCES 
Akerlof, G., 1980; A Theoly of Social Custon~. of Which Unemployment May Be One 
Consequence, Tile Q~~nr-terl)~ Jo ~rrial of Economics 94, 749-755. 
Akerlof, G., 1991, Procrastination and Obedience, An1eiiciri7 Ecoiiorizic Review 81, 2, 1-19, 
Arrow. I<., 1974, The Limits of Organization, (Norton). 
Barney, J., 1986, Organizational Culture : Can It Be a Source of Sustained Competitive 
Advantage ?, Tlle Acadeniy of ~Mniiagernerlt Review 11, 3, 656-665. 
Cremer, J., 1987, Corporate Cultul-e: Cognitive Aspects, (Virginia Polytechnic Institute 
and State University). 
Farrell, J. and G. Saloner, 1985, Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation, Railcl 
. lo~~rr~nl  of Ecorlor77ics 14, 1, 70-83. 
Farrell. J. and G. Saloner, 1986, Installed Base and Compatibility: Innovation, Product 
Announcement and Predation. American Ecorzor~7ic Review 76, 5, 940-955. 
Grossman, S. and 0 .  Hart, 1986, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A T h e o ~ y  of 
Vertical and Lateral Integration, Jo~u-rinl of Political Economy 94, 691-719. 
Heiner. R., 1983. The Origin of Predictable Behavior, Arnerican Econor?zic Review 73; 4, 
560-595. 
Hendrikse, G., 1991, Organizational Choice and Product Differentiation, Mnilngerinl arid 
Decisiorl Ecorzornics 12, 361-366. 
Hendrikse, G., 1993, Coordineren en motiveren. (Academic Service). 
Jones, G., 1983, Transaction Costs, Property Rights and Organizational Culture: an Ex- 
change Perspective, Arir?linistralive Scierice Quarterly 28, 3, 454-467. 
Kreps, D.: 1990; Corporate Culture and Economic Theory, in Alt, J .  and I<. Shepsle (eds.), 
Positive Perspectives on Political Economy, (Cambridge University Press). 
Leibenstein, H., 1982, The Prisoners' Dilemma in the Invisible Hand:  An Analysis of 
Intl-afirm Productivity, Ameiicar7 Ecoilonlic Rei~iew 72. 2, 92-97. 
Lippman, S. and R. Rumelt, 1982, Uncertain Imitability: an Analysis of Interfirm Diffe- 
rences in Efficiency under Competition, The Bell Jo~~rnnl of Ecorzornics 13, 418-438. 
Marschak, J. and R. Radner, 1972, Economic Theory of Teams, (Yale University Press). 
Morga~i, G. P. Frost and L. Pondy, 1983, Organizational Symbolism in Organizational 
Symbolism, Louis Pondy (ed.), (Jai Press Inc.). 
Nystrom, P. and W. Starbuck. 1984, To  Avoid Organizational Crises, Unlearn. Organha- 
tional Dynninics 12, 4, 53-65. 
Ouchi; W., 1980; Markets, Bureaucraties and Clans, Adr?zinistrcltii.e Science Qr~arter/J 25. 
129.141. 
ScharDtein, D. and J. Stein, 1990, Hel-d Behavior and Investment. Ainerican Ecorzoriiic 
Review 80. 3, 465-479. 
Schelling, T.. 1960, The Strategy of Conflict, (FIarvard University Press). 
Simon, H., 1965. Administrative Behaviour. (Free Press). 
Soeters, J. and I-I. Schreuder. 1988, The hiteraction Between National and Organiza- 
tional Culture in Accounting Firms, Accozrntirig, 00l.ganizaiions rnzd Socrely 13, 1, 75-85. 
Soeters, J., 1986, Excellent Companies as Social Movements, .lo~lnlal of ~Mariagemerzt 
Stlidies 23, 3, 299-312. 
Sniezek, J.A., D.R. Map and J.E. Sawyer, 1990, Social Uncertainty and Interdepeildence: 
A Study of Resoul.ce Allocation Decisions in Groups, O ~ ; ~ ~ z n i z a t i o n ~ l  Behir1'ior. iinil Hli- 
rnilr~ Decision Processes 46, 155-180. 
Weick, K.. 1987, Orgaiiizatio~lal Culture as a Source of High Reliability. Callfonlia Muna- 
gerilerzt Review 29, 2, 112-127. 
X X I F  v "  , ~ L L L , , ,  h+?,- D., 1980, Organizational Dec!ine: A Ncglcctcc! Topic in Organizatioiia? Sciin- 
ce, Accrdaniy of Managc~ment Rei~iew 5, 4. 577-588. 
Wilkins, A. and W. Ouchi, 1983, Efficient Cultures : Exploring the Relationship Between 
Culture and Orgailizational Performance, Adrizinistrative Science Quartet./J 28, 468-481. 
